1. Our Disgraceful Exit From the Paris Accord
Only
future generations will be able to calculate the full consequences of President
Trump’s incredibly shortsighted approach to climate change, since it is they
who will suffer the rising seas and crippling droughts that scientists say are
inevitable unless the world brings fossil fuel emissions to heel.
But
this much is clear now: Mr. Trump’s policies — the latest of which was his
decision to withdraw from the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change — have
dismayed America’s allies, defied the wishes of much of the American business
community he pretends to help, threatened America’s competitiveness as well as
job growth in crucial industries and squandered what was left of America’s
claim to leadership on an issue of global importance.
The
only clear winners, and we’ve looked hard to find them, are hard-core climate
deniers like Scott Pruitt at the Environmental Protection Agency and the
presidential adviser Stephen Bannon, and various fossil fuel interests that
have found in Mr. Trump another president (George W. Bush being the last)
credulous enough to swallow the bogus argument that an agreement to fight
climate change will destroy or at least inhibit the economy.
Mr.
Trump justified his decision by saying that the Paris agreement was a bad deal
for the United States, buttressing his argument with a cornucopia of dystopian,
dishonest and discredited data based on numbers from industry-friendly sources.
Those numbers are nonsense, as is his argument that the agreement would force
the country to make enormous economic sacrifices and cause a huge
redistribution of jobs and economic resources to the rest of the world.
In
truth, the agreement does not require any country to do anything; after the
failure of the 1997 Kyoto Accord, the United Nations, which oversees climate
change negotiations, decided that it simply did not have the authority to force
a legally binding agreement. Instead, negotiators in Paris aimed for, and
miraculously achieved, a voluntary agreement, under which more than 190
countries offered aspirational emissions targets, pledged their best efforts to
meet them and agreed to give periodic updates on how they were doing.
Paris
did not, in short, legally constrain Mr. Trump from doing the dumb things he
wanted to do. Which he already has. In the last few months, and without
consulting a single foreign leader, he has ordered rollbacks of every one of
the policies on which President Barack Obama based his ambitious pledge to
reduce America’s greenhouse gas emissions by 26 percent to 28 percent below
2005 levels by 2025 — most prominently, policies aimed at reducing greenhouse
gases from coal-fired power plants, automobiles and oil and gas wells.
But
if withdrawing from the agreement will not make Mr. Trump’s domestic policies
any worse than they are, it is still a terrible decision that could have
enormous consequences globally. In huge neon letters, it sends a clear message
that this president knows nothing or cares little about the science underlying
the stark warnings of environmental disruption. That he knows or cares little
about the problems that disruption could bring, especially in poor countries.
That he is unmindful that America, historically the world’s biggest emitter of
carbon dioxide, has a special obligation to help the rest of the world address
these issues. That he is oblivious to the further damage this will cause to his
already tattered relationship with the European allies. That his malfeasance
might now prompt other countries that signed the accord to withdraw from the
agreement, or rethink their emissions pledges.
2. How Europe Can Fight for Its Own Future
By The New York Times GUY
VERHOFSTADTJUNE 2, 2017
The
dedication ceremony of the new NATO headquarters in Brussels last
week.CreditStephen Crowley/The New York Times
BRUSSELS
— Donald Trump attended a meeting of NATO leaders here last
week. Addressing his peers in front of a new memorial for the Sept. 11 attacks,
the embattled American president refused to commit himself clearly to
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, according to which an attack on one
member state is considered an attack on all. The only time in NATO’s history
that this principle of collective defense has been invoked was immediately after the Sept. 11
attacks.
Despite
that, Mr. Trump once again castigated his NATO allies for failing to make
progress toward the target of spending 2 percent of their gross domestic
product on defense, jointly agreed to in 2006 and to
be achieved by 2024. The number of countries that have met the 2 percent target
since the agreement has fallen from six to five, showing that some European Union countries are in reverse gear.
It
is true that European countries do need to focus more attention on defense. For
too long in Europe, we have relied on the United States for our collective
security. The growing threat of an expansionist Russia, combined with President
Trump’s reluctance to recognize this threat and Britain’s increasing retreat to
isolationism, shows that Europe needs to take more responsibility for its own
security.
As
Germany’s chancellor, Angela Merkel, put it: “The times in which we can
fully count on others are somewhat over.” Speaking after last week’s NATO and
Group of 7 meetings, she said, “We have to fight for our own future ourselves,
for our destiny as Europeans.”
For
me, though, the real debate to be had in the coming years is not whether the 2
percent target is met by the 27 European Union countries. It is rather the fact
that Europe’s defense forces are riddled with inefficiencies and duplication,
which have undermined the union’s capabilities.
Per
capita, Europe spends a little more than 40 percent of what America
does on defense, yet we have only about 10 to 15 percent of its operational
capacities, which shows that military spending alone does not equate to
enhanced operational capabilities. As Judie Dempsey of the Carnegie Europe
think tank rightly points out, European countries have
designs for 17 different main battle tanks, 20 different fighter planes, 29
different destroyers or frigates and 20 different torpedo systems. This
structural variation is wasteful. It reduces the interoperability of systems, instead
of encouraging it.
Rather
than obsess about a 2 percent target at all costs, European Union countries
should work together to develop an effective European Defense Union. If it
spent strategically, within one defense framework and one defense market, the
union could theoretically afford, within the current budgetary limits and
respecting the NATO commitment of spending at 2 percent of G.D.P., to sustain
one of the world’s most modern and powerful military forces.
So
far, despite some progress, it has proved extremely difficult for member states
to pool their military resources and reduce the needless duplication of
military capabilities. The European Defense Agency, set up precisely to share
resources, has had an uphill struggle to achieve its goal.
There
has been some success in the integration of battle divisions within Europe.
Czech units are becoming increasingly integrated with German forces, as are the
Dutch, each playing to their strengths. The Eurocorps, a permanent
multinational rapid-reaction force involving troops from nine member states and
established for both NATO and European Union purposes, was declared operational
in 1995. This model of integration could be the nucleus from which fully
integrated military forces under the aegis of the European Defense Union could
grow.
Such
a union could also enable member states to develop a credible joint defense
target, which would be based on contributions to the union’s operational
capability, rather than an arbitrary goal for national spending.
A
common defense union would allow a more joined-up approach to
intelligence-sharing and cybersecurity. The leaking of malware designed by the
National Security Agency by Russian hackers represents a serious threat to
European infrastructure, as we saw with the recent ransomware attacks that hit
many European countries. Experts suggest this was an amateur criminal
operation, but the next attack could be far more devastating. The European
Union could establish a common cyberwarfare capability at a relatively low
cost.
3. Investment from China: is not easy to say love you
DW.Com
Chinese
investors further and further away in the "buy buy buy" the footsteps
of Europe, record-scale mergers and acquisitions. But Europeans face of
this development is bittersweet: on the one hand to worry about the loss of
sensitive technology, intellectual property rights can not be maintained; on
the other hand the Chinese out of the attractive price tag they often hard to
resist.
Love and hate
According
to a study by the Mercator China Research Center, China's total direct
investment in the EU in 2016 increased by 77% year on year to 35 billion
euros. While Germany accounted for the highest share of 31%. Over the
past decade, China has become an important source of investment for the
European continent. The main investment targets are high-tech fields. But
the huge investment from China has also raised the worries of the Europeans.
Midea's acquisition of KUKA
This
is one of the most watched Chinese-funded acquisitions in recent years. China's
home appliance giant, the US group spent 4.6 billion euros last year to buy the
German robot manufacturer Kuka (Kuka), causing a lot of sophisticated technical
concerns about the security concerns. The German government eventually to the
acquisition plan bright green, because the German national security interests
will not be threatened.
Into the "new era"
In
addition to Germany, China is another important investment in Europe is the
United Kingdom. In September 2016, the British government formally approved the
Hinckley C nuclear power plant project, the project is China's Guangdong
Nuclear Power Group and the French power group co-investment. With the British
exit the EU is a foregone conclusion, Beijing and London said the relationship
between the two countries will usher in a new "golden age", and China
is also the United Kingdom after the withdrawal of Europe want to conclude a
free trade agreement one of the countries.
Piraeus Harbor
It
is one of the largest ports in Greece and one of the top ten container
terminals in Europe and is the gateway to Asia, Eastern Europe and North
Africa. In 2016, China's state-owned COSCO Group (COSCO) acquisition of
the port 67% stake in the plan has been approved by the Greek Parliament, the
total amount of nearly 370 million euros acquisition, in addition COSCO Group
also plans to reinvest the port construction 350 million euros. But the
acquisition also led to the port workers strike, they worry that they lost
their jobs.
The largest in history!
So
far, the largest overseas M & A deal among Chinese investors is the
acquisition of Swiss agrochemical and seed giant Syngenta by China National
Chemical Group. Relevant M & A transactions are expected to be
completed in early June. China Chemical invested 43 billion US dollars, is
expected to purchase nearly 81% stake in Syngenta. Prior to this Chinese
state-owned chemical giant also acquired the German special machinery
manufacturer Krauss Ma Fei (KraussMaffei).
Eastern Europe and Europe
China's
investment in Europe is not limited to Western Europe, Central and Eastern
Europe has become the object of the launch of the charm of Beijing. Last year,
Premier Li Keqiang announced the establishment of a new fund to inject $ 11
billion into the region, including a number of cooperation agreements with the
Czech Republic. Only the Chinese private enterprise giant Huaxin energy,
in the Czech Republic acquired a airline, a winery, two media groups and a top
football club shares. Analysts believe that China's increasing investment
size and influence in Central and Eastern Europe has constrained the EU's
position on the EU-China issue.
Suffered defeat
More
and more Chinese overseas acquisitions have failed because Europe and the
United States have raised their regulatory thresholds. The study shows
that last year a total of 75 billion euros worth of 30 Chinese-funded overseas
mergers and acquisitions case because of regulatory restrictions and foreign
exchange trading restrictions, which one of the most watched should be China's
macro core fund acquisition of German chip manufacturers Aixtron's unsuccessful
case, and the main reason for the failure was the obstruction of the Obama
administration.
Worried about the loss of sensitive
technology
These
"miscarriage" M & A programs also reflect the growing concerns of
Europe in the face of China's investment, especially when it comes to sensitive
technology. But the European side of the frustration is also partly from
the investment imbalance: the size of the acquisition in the EU is greater than
the EU's acquisition in China. European companies complain that China
still has many obstacles to foreign investors in many areas such as
telecommunications, health care and logistics.
